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PENSION BONUS AND EX POST EVALUATIONS
➢ Ensure the financial sustainability of public pensions funds
because of the increase in life expectancy and the demographic
shocks.
→ One financial incentive aiming to postpone individual
retirement, the pension bonus: an agent gets a higher
pension if he retires beyond his full retirement age (full
benefits + an additional proportional bonus).
➢ The effectiveness is relatively limited:
• The global effect of financial incentives is principally led by
informed individuals (Chan and Stevens, 2008).
• In France, men are more responsive to the bonus (Benallah,
2011).
→ Another (behavioral) explanation, time inconsistency?
WHAT IS TIME INCONSISTENCY IN AN INTERTEMPORAL 
TRADE-OFF?
➢ Discounting function of a time-consistent agent (exponential
discounting):
𝛿𝑡 =
1
(1+𝑟)𝑡
as      𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 + 𝛿𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝛿
2𝑢𝑡+2 + …
With r the discounted rate
➢ But, for a time-inconsistent agent (hyperbolic discounting), a
decreasing discounted rate with time:
→ Impatient in the short-term and more patient in the long-
term (Thaler, 1981). He planned to do an action, but as this
action gets near, the agent changes his decision.
The tractable quasi-hyperbolic function (Laibson, 1997):
𝛽𝛿𝑡 =
𝛽
(1+𝑟)𝑡
as     𝑈𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽𝛿𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛿
2𝑢𝑡+2 + …
With the present-bias 0<β≤1. The lower β is, the more the agent
is time-inconsistent: overweighting of immediate outcome
(utility or disutility).
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THE DATA
The French “motivations de départ en retraite” survey (DREES, 2014)
on new retirees between July 2012 and June 2013, merged with
administrative data:
➢ Cohorts: 1948 – (first quarter) 1952
➢ Who were employees of the private and public sectors, non-
active civil servants or self-employed and who have contributed
at least one year to the private sector employee pension fund
during their careers.
THE MEASURE OF TIME PREFERENCES
Two ordinal synthetic scores:
➢ Short-term impatience (proxy of β)
➢ Long-term impatience (proxy of δ)
Based on questions on motivations to retire (4 modality scale –
“strongly agree”, “agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”). For
instance:
➢ “You decided to retire because you had reached the Early
Retirement Age (ERA)”
→ Linked to short-term impatience (4 items)
➢ “You decided to retire because you wanted to enjoy retirement
as long as possible”
→ Linked to long-term impatience (5 items)
The aggregation of answers constitute two final scores, standardized,
with 0 mean and a variance of 1.
ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
A recursive bivariate probit model with two latent dependent
variables:
ቊ
𝑦1
∗ = 𝑋1𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑍 + 𝜀1, 𝑦1= 1 𝑦1
∗ > 0 ,
𝑦2
∗ = 𝑋2𝛽2 + 𝛾𝑦1 + 𝜀2, 𝑦2= 1 𝑦2
∗ > 0 ,
with 𝑦1 the bonus knowledge, 𝑦2 delayed retirement to get the
bonus and 𝑍 a set of instruments.
𝜀1
𝜀2
→ 𝑁
0
0
,
1 𝜌
𝜌 1
with ρ the correlation between the error terms.
→ This specification allows to control the likely endogeneity of
the bonus knowledge (𝑦1).
➢ By fixing both short-term and long-term impatience, an average
difference in predicted probabilities of -31.60 (55.41% compared
to 23.81%) between the most time-consistent agent and the
most time-inconsistent agent.
Average predicted probability of retiring with a pension bonus
CONCLUSION
➢ Time inconsistency is a key determinant of the decision not to
delay retirement to get the bonus: another explanation of the
(relatively) limited impact of financial incentives aiming to
postpone retirement.
➢ We need to integrate nonstandard preferences in individual
retirement analyses.
➢ Considering nonstandard preferences can improve public
information and the efficiency of public policies (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008).
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RESULTS
➢ Both short-term and long-term impatience are significant and
impact negatively the probability of retiring with pension bonus.
→ A time-inconsistent agent has a lower probability to delay
his retirement to get the bonus compared to a time-
consistent agent.
Discounting functions
Informed
Uninformed
Informed
Uninformed
➢ The endogeneity of the bonus knowledge is confirmed (𝜌 < 0).
